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412 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 Different and more or less conflicting systems of law, different and more or less competing systems of jurisdiction, in one and the same region, are compatible with a high state of civilization, with a strong government, and with an administration of justice well enough liked and sufficiently understood by those who are concerned. 1 INTRODUCTION States are increasingly delegating or transferring powers to interna­tional organizations,2 and international organizations are increasingly pushing the limits of the powers conferred upon them. This expansion of powers embraces all areas of international authority-particularly lawmaking and adjudication. 3 Recognizing that international organiza­tions have gained this greater role, scholars have begun to think more deeply about the legitimacy, accountability, and good governance of in­ternational organizations,4 and States ( as well as non-State entities, such I. S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I xxiii, XCV (2d ed. reissued 1968) (1898), cited in Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A 
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1587 n.169 (2003). 2. See generally DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OFSOVEREIGN POWERS (2005). On the constitutionality in the United States of delegations to inter­national organizations, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitu­
tion, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Thomas M. Franck, Can the United 
States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International Regimes?, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY I (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000); David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation 
of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); and Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 {2004). 3. See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS(2005). 4. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal­
lenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the Interna­
tional Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510 (2003); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379 (1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Ad­
ministrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and 
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 68 I (1996--
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as the European Union 5 and nongovernmental organizations), knowing 
what is at stake, have become more forthright in seeking a seat at the ta-
ble. 
As the powers of international organizations have expanded, the need 
to maintain control of international organizations has also grown. "Con-
trol" means checks on the powers of an organization that ensure that the 
organization acts within its assigned mandate.7 Controls, such as the 
checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution, are necessary in any sys-
tem of limited powers. Without them, restrictions, as they appear in an 
organization's charter, are liable to disappear, and the organization is 
likely to take actions either in violation of its allocated authority (the 
claims of ultra vires and excks de pouvoir)8 or for a purpose for which 
that authority was not granted (the claim of dtournement de pouvoir).9 
Depending on their content, such actions could jeopardize the legiti-
macy of the organization and, conceivably, its very existence. Controls, 
therefore, are crucial to the successful operation of an international or-
ganization; they have greater importance the greater the power given to 
the organization. This is true whether the international organization (or 
one of its components) exercises political, legislative, administrative, or 
judicial functions. 
But control is not everything. International organizations need a cer-
tain degree of independence in order to accomplish their tasks, and, in-
deed, that is assumed by the States that create them.10 Independence-in 
the forms of autonomy and neutrality-can "enhanc[e] the efficiency 
and legitimacy of collective and individual actions."" The assumption 
1997). 
5. On the European Union and European Community's attempts to become more active in in-
ternational fora-and, occasionally, to supplant the roles of its member states-see, for example, 
Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Chang-
ing Sources ofInternationalLaw, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 155-61 (2005). 
6. Cf John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 511, 604 (2000) ("[T]here is a sad dilemma at the heart of all constitutions: the more wealth 
a regime creates, the greater the incentives for interest groups to distort the system to their advan-
tage."); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991) (noting 
how "the closure of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice"). 
7. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 1 (1992). 
8. See id. at 6. 
9. See generally J.E.S. Fawcett, Ddtoumement de Pouvoir by InternationalOrganizations,33 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1957). 
10. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through FormalInternational 
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 16-23 (1998). 
11. Id.at 16; see also Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, The Independence ofInter-
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414 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 of independence is particularly true for international courts, which, like their domestic counterparts, require independence as a prerequisite of their legitimacy and the successful fulfillment of their responsibilities.A tension between independence and control is inherent in all forms of international delegation, but no more so than with delegation to inter­
1national courts. 3 Courts are accorded independence on the conditionthat there are sufficient effective controls in place, and controls are tai­lored so as not to impede too greatly on judicial independence. In some highly developed domestic legal systems, such as the United States, 14 the controls are so finely tuned and trusted that courts are allowed pow­ers, in some instances, to negate the acts of other governmental entities (judicial review of legislative and administrative acts) or to develop the 
15law on their own ( common-law-making). In less developed systems, such as international law, courts do not have such expansive authori­ties, 16 but their impact is no less great and their role is no less important. International law scholars have argued recently that we need not worry about the potential excesses of international courts-and particu­larly international judicial lawmaking-because existing controls effec­
17tively keep courts in check. Described variously as "bounded discre-
national Organizations: Concept and Application, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 253, 256 (2006). 
12. See Edward Gordon et al., The Independence and Impartiality of International Judges, 83
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 508 (1989); Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts 
and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271 (2003); 
Symposium, The Independence and Accountability of the International Judge, 2 LAW & PRAC. 
INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 3 (2003). See generally Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and 
Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (2005). 
13. Cf Jonas Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What
Consequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 23, 28 (2002) ("What truly makes delegation a dilemma is the 
fact that its very rationale may prevent government principals from establishing effective control 
mechanisms."). 
14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1251-53 (I 984) (describ­
ing the external and internal constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court); Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,679 (1993) (concluding that U.S. "[j]udges are con­
strained by the political system that surrounds them"). 
15. Of course, the exercise of such authorities by courts in even the most developed legal sys­
tems is controversial in particular cases and is rejected by some categorically. 
16. See Joel P. Trachtrnan, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J.
333,347 (1999). 
17. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 V AND. L. REV. I (2006); Tom Ginsburg, 
Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 63 I (2005); Laur­
ence R. Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained Independ­
ence, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 253 (Stefan Voigt, Max Albert & Dieter 
Schmidtchen eds., 2006); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create Inter-
                                                                                                                                         
  
  
  
  
  
  
415 2008] COMPETITION AND CONTROL tion" 18 or "constrained independence," 19 these scholars assert that inter­national courts operate in a "strategic space" in which "the political constraint is operating effectively."2° Consequently, to the extent any judicial lawmaking or innovation has occurred, it has been tacitly ap­proved of by the relevant States, which therefore removes any questions about its legitimacy.21This Essay takes issue with this assumption that controls on interna­tional courts are sufficient and effective. To the contrary, existing con­trols over international courts are, in practice, relatively weak. Because of structural constraints on international lawmaking and the intricacies of international politics and diplomacy,22 States generally lack the abil­ity to correct interpretive errors made by courts, and because of theprinciple ofjudicial independence, States are unable to direct judges to decide cases in certain ways or otherwise control the substance ofjudi­cial decisions. Judges, for their part, naturally have their own interests and are tempted and encouraged to depart from their limited roles in or­der to expand their own and their courts' authorities. Internal controls are, thus, relatively weak as well. This is not to say, certainly, that exist­ing controls do not sometimes work or that judges seldom rule in accor­dance with law. It is simply to point out that controls are not as effective as they are purported to be. Because States have no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of in­ternational courts and because States have the ability not to comply with judicial decisions, the weaknesses ofjudicial controls means that States are more likely to avoid courts, abandon them, or disregard their deci­sions, potentially condemning courts to irrelevance. In order to preserve and strengthen international courts, we need to think anew about how best to maintain control over them. 
national Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 942-54 
(2005); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247,249 (2004); cf Mike Burstein, The Will to Enforce: 
An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 423 (2006); William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Exceeded Its Authority?: A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Gov­
ernment Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79 (2001). 
18. Ginsburg, supra note 17.
19. Helfer, supra note 17, at 253; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 942-54.
20. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 249.
21. See Danner, supra note 17, at 4.
22. Cf Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-contracting
Political Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
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The answer is not, as some have suggested, for States to exert greater 
direct control over international judges.2 3 As others have pointed out, 
international courts with independent judges serve useful purposes for 
States by, among other things, 24 "enhanc[ing] the credibility of interna-
tional commitments," 25 thereby ensuring the relevant "[legal] regime's 
perceived legitimacy and continued operation.', 26 More State control 
over judges would consequently be counterproductive. The greater the 
direct control over judges by States the lesser the utility of those judges 
and their courts to States. 
Instead, this Essay argues that the increasing competition among in-
ternational courts that has resulted from their recent proliferation 27 has 
and will continue to more effectively constrain international judicial 
power and, as a result, increase the likelihood that States will recognize 
and accede to international judicial authority. Competition among courts 
may also lead to better-and perhaps convergent-decisions over the 
long-term. Though some have acknowledged in passing the possible 
benefits of competition among courts for norm-development, 28 no one 
23. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependencein InternationalTribunals, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). 
24. Other reasons for delegating authority to international courts include efficiency, expertise, 
domestic politics, mimicry, and blame shifting. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 22, at 329; Rachel 
Brewster, Rule-BasedDisputeResolution in InternationalTrade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006); 
Tallberg, supra note 13, at 26-27. There are also, of course, reasons for not delegating authority 
to international courts or for limiting such authority. See, e.g., David P. Forsythe, The Interna-
tionalCourt of Justice at Fifty, in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER 
FIFTY YEARS 385, 398 (A.S. Muller, D. Rai6 & J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997); Joel P. Trachtman, 
Book Note, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 858, 860 (2004) (reviewing JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF 
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)). 
25. Helfer & Slaughter, supranote 17, at 904; see also id. at 931-36. 
26. Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World,90 MINN. L. REv. 1720, 1768 (2006) (review-
ing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)). 
27. There is, by now, a substantial literature on the proliferation of international courts. In ad-
dition to pieces cited elsewhere in this Essay, see also Symposium, The ProliferationofInterna-
tional Tribunals: Piercing Together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); and 
Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources ofNorms in InternationalLaw, 25 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 845 (2004). 
28. See Ian Brownlie, The PeacefulSettlement ofInternationalDisputes in Practice,7 PACE 
INT'L L. REV. 257, 276 (1995); Thomas Buergenthal, The ProliferationofDisputes, Dispute Set-
tlement Proceduresand Respectfor the Rule ofLaw, 22 ARB. INT'L 495, 497 (2006) [hereinafter 
Buergenthal, Proliferation of Disputes]; Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International 
Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 274 (2001) [hereinafter 
Buergenthal, Proliferationof InternationalCourts]; William W. Burke-White, InternationalLe-
gal Pluralism,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 977 (2004); Jonathan 1.Charney, Is InternationalLaw 
Threatenedby Multiple InternationalTribunals?,271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 354, 361 (1998); 
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has provided a comprehensive argument in its favor, linked competition 
with control, or offered a defense against competition's critics who 
claim, as Gilbert Guillaume, former judge and president of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), recently did, that "[t]he law of the mar-
ket... cannot be the law of justice. 29 
Part I explains why effective controls are necessary for international 
adjudication. Part II argues that States, with minor exceptions, currently 
do not have effective mechanisms to control international courts once 
those courts have been established. Part III looks at internal control 
mechanisms and asks whether judges can effectively control their own 
interests in expanding the powers of their courts. Part IV contends that 
the international legal system, as it is presently constituted, is well-
suited to competitive adjudication, that such competition can provide an 
effective judicial control mechanism, and that, on balance, this and 
other characteristics of competition enhance international dispute reso-
lution. To this end, the Essay concludes with an argument against "sys-
tem-protective ' 30 judicial devices such as inter-court deference, and in 
favor of the establishment of "competition-friendly" procedures. 
Fausto Pocar, The Proliferationof InternationalCriminalCourts and Tribunals: A Necessity in 
the CurrentInternationalCommunity, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 304, 307 (2004). 
29. Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of Proliferation:A Blueprintfor Action, 2 J. 
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 300, 301 (2004); see also, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING 
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 127 (2003); Gilbert Guillaume, The 
Future of InternationalJudicial Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 862 (1995) ("New 
courts or tribunals should be created only when necessary. Moreover, one may wonder whether a 
mechanism could not be devised to avoid divergences of case law."); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards 
an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Presi-
dent, Int'l Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations: The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Le-
gal Order (Oct. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-
= 
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=-3&p 1 1&p2=3&p3 1. 
30. Martinez, supranote 29, at 448. 
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I. CONSENT AND CONTROL 
International adjudication is still a consent-based system. 31 States are 
under no obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of an international 
court, and even when they do, they reflect the limits of their consent in 
the terms of the court's mandate or (if permitted) in the terms of their 
accession to it.32 Such limits can stipulate the court's subject matter ju-
risdiction33 and any other preconditions on its exercise. The mandates 
may also limit the court's procedures, what law the court may apply, 
and what remedies it may impose.34 
Like all organizations with limited mandates, restrictions on interna-
tional courts would be meaningless without effective control mecha-
nisms. Controls are common in all successful national constitutional 
systems. The system of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution is 
the most obvious example. Controls can be in the original document 
laying out the institution's mandate or evolve over time. They can take 
on a variety of forms. They can be exercised by coequal structures-for 
example, separate branches of government-or hierarchically, such as 
by a higher court over a lower court. They can be formal or informal. 
They can be direct or indirect. They can be internal or external. Internal 
controls are those exercised by the institution itself They are, in other 
words, methods of self-control. External controls, by contrast, are those 
effected by outside bodies. 
31. Consent, clearly, is more complicated with regard to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were founded not on individual State consent but the consent 
of a group of States by decision of the Security Council. As I discuss below, see infra Section 
IV.B, the meaning of consent can also be attenuated when international adjudication is an integral 
component of a larger diplomatic bargain. Even so, the argument, made by some, that interna-
tional adjudication is moving (or has moved) from a consensual to a compulsory system is, I be-
lieve, exaggerated. See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensualto the Compul-
sory Paradigmin InternationalAdjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL. 791 (2007). 
32. This discussion is based in part on REISMAN, supra note 7, at 1-3; and W. Michael Reis-
man, The SupervisoryJurisdictionofthe InternationalCourtofJustice: International Arbitration 
andInternationalAdjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 28-37 (1996). See also Laurence R. 
Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-NationalSystems: The Case of the Uniform Do-
mainName DisputeResolution Policy,43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141, 188-236 (2001). 
33. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 
1179, 59 Stat. 1031; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 38544, availableat http://www.un.orglaw/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
34. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supranote 33, art. 38. 
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Not all control systems are created equal though. Some are more tar-
geted than others; some are more effective than others; and some are 
more desirable than others. Internal controls are more efficient because 
they eliminate or reduce the costs of correction by external agents, but 
most legal systems, including international law, contain a complicated 
and intertwined combination of internal and external controls in order to 
reduce the risk of control failure and to ensure optimal control effect. 
However constructed, controls provide States the comfort they seek 
at the moment of consent that an international court will not venture be-
yond its assigned mandate, and controls continue to provide States the 
security they require to maintain their consent throughout a court's exis-
tence. The work controls do, in other words, is not only objective-that 
is, actually establishing limits to judicial action. It is, and perhaps more 
importantly, subjective-the creation of the perception that courts are 
acting in accordance with their mandates. It is that perception that al-
lows a risk-averse State to do what it need not do-consent to a court's 
jurisdiction. And the failure to create such an impression (or, alterna-
tively, the undermining of an existing positive impression) helps 
weaken consent. 
Simply stated, without control there would be no consent, and with-
out consent there would be no adjudication. Thus, when controls are 
removed (or perceived to be removed), consent is likely to go as well. 
And when controls are weakened, so too is consent. Effective controls 
are, therefore, necessary for the existence and success of international 
dispute resolution. It is important, then, to understand whether there are 
sufficient and effective controls on international courts, and, if not, how 
they can be improved. 
II. CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS BE CONTROLLED BY STATES? 
On the surface there are a multitude of ways for States to control in-
ternational courts. States elect a court's judges; they set the court's 
budget and appropriate funds; they specify the terms of the court's ju-
risdiction and write the laws that the court applies in particular cases; 
and, if all else fails, they can withdraw from a court's jurisdiction. The 
standard view is that these multiple mechanisms of controlling interna-
tional courts are effective and sufficient.35 
35. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 17; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 17. 
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But controlling an international court is not as easy as it looks, for 
two reasons. First, State control of international courts is limited be-
cause courts (and their judges), as an essential component of their exis-
tence, are provided judicial independence and because the tools for the 
control of courts are cumbersome and not easily employed. External 
controls and their limitations-judicial independence and structural 
constraints inherent to the international system-are the subjects of this 
Part. Second, State control is limited because international courts, par-
ticularly their judges, are not simple puppets-courts and judges have 
interests and authorities of their own, interests that occasionally differ 
from those of the States that established them. This second set of rea-
sons, which pertain to judicial self-control, is the subject of Part III. 
A. ExternalControlson InternationalCourts 
External controls on international courts are many and various, en-
compassing actions both ex ante and ex post.36 They come in five cate-
gories: (1) control over the court's mandate; (2) control over the rules 
the court applies; (3) control over the court's staffing; (4) control over 
the court's budget; and (5) control over a court's ability to make and 
apply its decisions. 
States control a court's mandate, the basic document that establishes 
the court and sets the terms of the court's jurisdiction and operation. 
Mandate control operates both ex ante and ex post. States, for instance, 
can limit a court's jurisdiction ex ante, and if they find that the original 
jurisdictional grant is flawed, they have the ability to revise the court's 
mandate ex post. 37 The Security Council, for instance, has amended a 
number of times the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) in order to enhance the efficiency of the courts by 
increasing the number of judges available to hear cases and by adding 
an additional prosecutor.38 The Council has also set out "completion 
36. For a useful summary of various control mechanisms, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 
17, at 944, tbl. 3. 
37. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 41, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 561, 570, available at 
http://www.itlos.org/documents_publications/documents/statute-en.pdf (providing a means for 
the amendment of the Statute); Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 69 
(same). 
38. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1512, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1512 (Oct. 27, 2003) (ICTR); S.C. Res. 1503, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (ICTR); S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (Aug. 
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strategies" for the two ad hoc criminal tribunals, which establish "target 
dates ' 39 for the conclusion of investigations, trials, and "all [other] 
work."40 Though the dates specified by the Council are couched in less 
than binding language, the evident threat is that the courts will be shut 
down, and their mandates terminated, at the close of the specified pe-
riod. 
States can also try to control a court through the strict drafting of ap-
plicable law ex ante, subsequent interpretation of the law, and the for-
mal revision of that law ex post. To this end, most treaties allow for 
amendment and some provide mechanisms for the parties to adopt au-
thoritative interpretations of the agreement. 
The detailed Statute, Elements of Crimes, and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence set out by the drafters of the Rome Statute and the States 
Parties to the International Criminal Court demonstrate the lengths to 
which States can go to limit a court's discretion ex ante.41 These docu-
ments were a deliberate attempt by their drafters to limit judicial discre-
tion through detailed rules (as opposed to standards). 42 This move re-
sulted, in part, from concerns that the crimes in the Court's Statute were 
too vague, infringing on the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine 
lege) and allowing for the possibility of judicial lawmaking.43 It also re-
14, 2002) (ICTR and ICTY). 
39. President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/28 (Aug. 4, 2004). 
40. See S.C. Res. 1534, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, 7, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). On the completion strategies, see Larry D. Johnson, 
Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human Rights 
StandardsandExcludingImpunity, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (2005); Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial 
Effects of the "Completion Strategies" on the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal Tribunals,99 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 142 (2005); and Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy: 
Efforts to Achieve Accountabilityfor War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 82 
(2005). 
41. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/I/3 (Part II-A) (Sept. 2002); 
Elements of Crimes, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP 1/3 (Part II-B) (Sept. 2002). 
42. Cf Frederick Schauer, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, International 
Criminal Court: Rule-Based Decision-Making in the Development of Legal Institutions in Politi-
cal Environments, at 12-13 (May 18, 2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/Schauerpresentation.pdf (noting "the advantages of legitimacy and 
transparency that come from rules far more than from discretion" and suggesting the benefits of 
this approach for the international system). 
43. See William K. Lietzau, InternationalCriminalLaw After Rome: Concernsfrom a US. 
Military Perspective,64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 122-23 (2001); see also William K. Li-
etzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillarsfor the International 
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flected dissatisfaction with active rulemaking by ICTY and ICTR 
judges.44 Indeed, one former-ICTY judge described the Elements of 
Crimes as "an overwhelming exercise in legal positivism," 45 and con-
cluded that the "drafting of the ICC Statute and of the Elements of 
Crimes illustrates clearly an intent on [the] part [of the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute] to maintain control over the making of international 
law and to keep a tight leash on the ability of international judges to go 
beyond what [States] have agreed to."'46 Another former-ICTY judge 
and president, referring to the ICC Statute, lamented that it "seems to 
evince a certain mistrust in the Judges. 47 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an 
example of ex post rules control. Pursuant to that agreement, the 
NAFTA's Free Trade Commission (FTC), whose members are the three 
NAFTA parties, has the authority to interpret provisions of NAFTA, 
and the FTC's interpretations are binding on NAFTA dispute resolution 
panels.48 In fact, such interpretations may effectively "overrule" inter-
pretations given to the same provisions in earlier decisions of dispute 
resolution panels. In 2001, the Commission did precisely this following 
three awards interpreting a particular NAFTA provision.49 The three 
Criminal Court,32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477 (1999). 
44. Article 51 of the Rome Statute provides that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to 
be adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. Judges can only adopt provisional rules in "urgent 
cases," which will then be reviewed by a subsequent Assembly of States Parties. Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, supranote 33, art. 51(3). 
45. David Hunt, The International Criminal Court:High Hopes, 'CreativeAmbiguity' andan 
UnfortunateMistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 56, 59 (2004). 
46. Id.at61. 
47. Antonio Cassese, The Statuteof the International Criminal Court: Some PreliminaryRe-
flections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 163 (1999); accordBoard of Editors, The Rome Statute: A Ten-
tative Assessment, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 1901, 1904 n.2 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) 
(suggesting that the detailed drafting of the ICC's Elements of Crimes was "symptomatic of 
States' concern to control the Court and its judges"). 
48. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1131(2), 2001(2)(c), Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The WTO Agreement also allows its mem-
bers, by a three-fourths vote, to interpret the Agreement. See Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization art. IX:2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 159. The members have never 
adopted an interpretation and only once has an interpretation been proposed. See Communication 
from the European Communities to Chairman of the General Council, Requestfor an Authorita-
tive InterpretationPursuantto Article IX2 of the MarrakeshAgreement Establishingthe World 
Trade Organization,WT/GC/W/133 (Jan. 25, 1999); Communication from the European Com-
munities to Chairman of the General Council, Requestfor an AuthoritativeInterpretationPursu-
ant to Article IX2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
WT/GC/W/143 (Feb. 5, 1999). 
49. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I, Award of 
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NAFTA parties decided that these interpretations were incorrect, and 
the FTC issued its own interpretation. 50 The FTC's interpretation was 
subsequently followed by panels in The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United52 
States5' and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada. 
Another technique by which States could possibly control courts is 
through judicial appointments. 53 Staffing control can take place in a 
number of ways: through the establishment (or not) ofjudicial term lim-
its; through the length of the judge's term of office; through the nomina-
tion, election, and reappointment of judges; through the granting of cer-
tain privileges and immunities to judges; and through the designation of 
judicial seats for certain States, regions, or persons with particular com-
petences and experience. 54 Presumably, States put some thought into 
those who they nominate and elect to the international bench. Further, it 
is assumed that judges are more likely to do a good job if they wish to 
be re-appointed and that a judge who does a poor job will not be re-
nominated or re-elected. 
States might also control courts through their budgets, as courts are 
entirely dependent on States and international organizations for their 
funding. 55 The expenses of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for ex-
the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal (Aug. 30, 2000), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial 
Award of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialawardfinal_13-11 -00.pdf; Pope & Talbot, 
Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), availableat http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/AwardMerits-e.pdf. 
50. Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 3 1, 
2001), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf (interpreting NAFTA 
article 1105(l)'s "minimum standard of treatment in accordance with international law" provi-
sion). 
51. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award of the 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal, 125-128 (June 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf. 
52. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal in Respect of 
Damages, 51 (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/damageaward.pdf. 
53. See generally Adam M. Smith, "JudicialNationalism" in InternationalLaw: National 
Identity andJudicialAutonomy at the 1CW, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 197 (2005). 
54. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supranote 33, art. 36(5) (re-
quiring there to be an "equivalent proportion" of judges with competences in criminal law and 
procedure and in international humanitarian law and the law of human rights); id. art. 36(8) (stat-
ing the parties shall take into account in the selection of judges, inter alia, "[e]quitable geographic 
representation" and a "fair representation of male and female judges"). 
55. See generally Thordis Ingadottir, The FinancingofInternationalizedCriminalCourtsand 
Tribunals, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTs 271 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Andrd Noll-
kaemper & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004); Cesare Romano, The Priceof InternationalJustice, 4 
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ample, are "borne by voluntary contributions from the international 
community., 56 The Presidents of the International Criminal Court and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) depend on 
their respective States Parties to bear their courts' expenses, in ways de-
cided by their Assemblies of States Parties. 7 And the Presidents of the 
ICJ, ICTY, and ICTR go hat in hand to the UN General Assembly at 
least every other year to garner sufficient funds.58 Conceivably, States 
can signal their displeasure with a court by limiting its funds. Indeed, 
one scholar has asserted recently that "[k]eeping [the ICJ] on a tight 
budget looks increasingly like a poorly concealed attempt to influence 
59 it."1 
The final category of external control is decision control: mecha-
nisms that remove a State from a court's jurisdiction, either ex ante or 
ex post, or deny the applicability to a State of a court's ruling. Decision 
control is different from mandate control because it operates at the level 
of the individual State. Jurisdictional avoidance can occur in three ways: 
a State may refuse to consent to a court's jurisdiction in whole or in 
part; a State may take a reservation to a treaty, thereby denying a court 
the ability to apply the specified rule to that State; and a State, having 
previously consented to a court's jurisdiction or to a treaty regime, usu-
ally may exit. Denial of a court's ruling takes the form of noncompli-
6 0 
ance. 
There are, of course, many examples of decision control. In 1986, in 
reaction to rulings by the ICJ, the United States withdrew its blanket 
LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 281 (2005). 
56. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Es-
tablishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). 
States have not always voluntarily provided sufficient funds to the Special Court, and the United 
Nations was called upon in 2004 to make up the shortfall. See G.A. Res. 58/284, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/58/284 (Apr. 8, 2004). 
57. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, art. 19; Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 115. 
58. The budgets of the ICJ and the ad hoc tribunals are voted on every two years, though 
there are occasional amendments. See, e.g., G.A. Res 58/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/255 (Dec. 23, 
2003) (ICTY); G.A. Res. 59/274, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/274 (Dec. 23, 2004) (ICTY); G.A. Res 
59/273, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/273 (Dec. 23, 2004) (ICTR); G.A. Res 58/253, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/5 8/253 (Dec. 23, 2003) (ICTR); The Secretary-General, ProposedProgrammeBudgetfor 
the Biennium 2006-2007, Part III, U.N. Doc. A/60/6 (Sect. 7) (Apr. 22, 2005) (Secretary-
General's request on behalf of the ICJ for the 2006-2007 biennium ICJ budget). 
59. Romano, supra note 55, at 286. 
60. On noncompliance, see Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the InternationalRule of 
Law, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 189 (2006). 
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consent to the Court's jurisdiction, 61 and in 2005 the United States 
withdrew from a treaty that gave the Court jurisdiction over disputes 
pertaining to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.62 The 
United States now generally refuses to consent to any treaty that pro-
vides the ICJ with jurisdiction over disputes without having the option 
to waive such a provision.63 But the United States, certainly, is far from 
the only State that has avoided-partially or entirely-the decisional au-
thority of international courts or failed to comply with a court's ruling.64 
For example, in 2002, Australia revised its consent to ICJ and ITLOS 
jurisdiction to exclude disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime 
zones, lest a possible claim be brought against it in those fora by East 
Timor.65 And in 2004, the United Kingdom altered its general consent 
61. See Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. 
Sec'y-Gen. (Oct. 7, 1985), 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State (Oct. 7, 
1985), 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); Legal Adviser Sofaer's Statement (Dec. 4, 1985), DEP'T STATE 
BULL. Jan. 1986, at 67. 
62. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawnfrom World JudicialBody, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 2005, at A16; Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, 
U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/87288.pdf. 
63. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 66(3), G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 
31, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 37; Letter of Submittal of the Department of State on the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 109-6, at 20 (2005). 
64. See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 39 
(1974); cf Laurence R. Heifer, OverlegalizingHuman Rights: InternationalRelations Theory and 
the Commonwealth CaribbeanBacklash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1832 (2002). 
65. See Declaration [of Australia] Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice Con-
cerning Australia's Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Mar. 21, 
2002, 2175 U.N.T.S. 494, available at http://www.aus-
tlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/5.html (amending its declaration to preclude "any dispute 
concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the ex-
clusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the 
exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimita-
tion"); Declaration [of Australia] Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Concerning the Application to Australia of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of that Convention, 
Mar. 21, 2002, 2177 U.N.T.S. 307, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/6.html (declaring that Australia "does not 
accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the procedures re-
ferred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect to disputes concerning the in-
terpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations"). Aus-
tralia was concerned that East Timor, upon gaining independence, would submit a dispute to the 
ICJ or ITLOS regarding sovereignty over the Timor Gap. See Gillian Triggs & Dean Bialek, Aus-
tralia Withdraws MaritimeDisputesfrom the CompulsoryJurisdictionof the InternationalCourt 
of Justiceand the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
L. 423, 423 (2002). 
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to the jurisdiction of the ICJ so that a threatened case by Mauritius 
would not fall within the Court's competence.66 
B. Limitationson ExternalControls 
External controls, from the look of them, are imposing, but upon 
closer examination they are less so. Aside from decision control (dis-
cussed further below), which works unilaterally and thus is not easily 
mediated, external controls require cooperation and coordination among 
States and therefore are more susceptible to frustration. As a conse-
quence, there are two fundamental limitations on external controls over 
international courts: judicial independence and structural constraints in-
herent in the international system. These limits significantly undermine 
the efficacy of external controls over international courts. 
As an initial matter, States have less control over judges than they 
do over other international civil servants because of judicial independ-
6 7 ence. Independence, here, means the freedom from coercion.68 Such 
independence means that States cannot direct judges to decide cases in 
certain ways, even if those judges are nationals of that State. Though the 
presumption of judicial independence may not have obtained for certain 
ICJ judges from totalitarian States during the Cold War,69 it must be as-
sumed today. This is not to suggest, certainly, that judges are com-
pletely impartial, especially when they decide cases in which their State 
of nationality is a party, only that judges are free to decide cases in ac-
66. See Declaration of the United Kingdom Under Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, 
July 5, 2004, 2271 U.N.T.S. 285 (altering the United Kingdom's previous declaration so that the 
Court's jurisdiction would henceforth cover only disputes arising after January 1, 1974 and those 
that are brought by States that are not and have never been a member of the Commonwealth). The 
United Kingdom was fearful that Mauritius would bring a case regarding the status of the Chagos 
Islands in the Indian Ocean. See Nita Bhalla, Mauritius Stakes Claim for Chagos, BBC NEWS, 
Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/afiica/3583927.stm; Ewen MacAskill, Mauritius 
May Sue for Diego Garcia, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2004, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1255446,00.html. 
67. See Steve Chamovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND 
PROSPECTS 219, 228 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano & Ruth Mackenzie 
eds., 2002) (noting that "judicial independence was recognized by the parties drafting the WTO"). 
68. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts ofJudicialIndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 
536 (1999). 
69. See Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru Oda and the InternationalCourt 
ofJustice, 33 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 185, 187 (1995). The Soviet Union claimed the same with re-
gard to Western ICJ judges. See Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contributionto InternationalAdjudica-
tion: ProfessorKrylov 's JurisprudentialLegacy, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 365 (1964). 
427 2008] COMPETITION AND CONTROL 
cordance with their views, which will necessarily reflect their back-
grounds.7 ° 
That States take judicial independence seriously became evident dur-
ing the discussion in the Security Council of the completion strategies 
for the ICTY and ICTR.71 Some States worried that directing the ad hoc 
courts to complete their missions by certain dates impermissibly di-
rected the courts, particularly their judges, to take certain positions. 
France, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, made clear 
its view that the completion strategies "should not be construed as un-
dermining the principle of independence of the two Tribunals and the 
separation of their functions [from those of the Council]. 72 As a conse-
quence of the need and desire for judicial independence, it has been, ac-
cording to a UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, "ex-
tremely difficult for... the Tribunals' parent organ, the Security Council, 
to hold [them] strictly accountable."7 
Aside from judicial independence, there are numerous structural con-
straints that limit the ability of States to control international courts. 
There are three types: (1) multiple and collective principals constraints; 
(2) monitoring constraints; and (3) competing nonlegal policy con-
straints. 
Constraints on State control flow, in part, from the fact that interna-
tional courts have multiple and/or collective principals. Thus, even 
when the control mechanism is centralized, such as through the Security 
Council or an Assembly of States Parties, control is effectively miti-
gated by the inability of States to agree. This is especially evident with 
rules control. Unlike in the United States and other developed legal sys-
tems, where judicial interpretations of statutory74 and constitutional 75 
70. Cf Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the InternationalCourt of Justice Bi-
ased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005). 
71. As a formal matter, statutes of international courts state that judges are to be "independ-
ent." See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 2 ("The Court shall 
be composed of a body of independent judges...."). 
72. Letter Dated 30 March 2004 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/265 (2004). 
73. Ralph Zacklin, The FailingsofAd Hoc InternationalTribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 
541, 543 (2004). 
74. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (concluding that "Congress and its committees are 
aware of the [Supreme] Court's statutory decisions, devote significant efforts toward analyzing 
their policy implications, and override those decisions with a frequency heretofore unreported"). 
75. Four constitutional amendments have overturned Supreme Court decisions: the Eleventh 
Amendment, overturning Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); the Fourteenth Amendment, 
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provisions can be and are overturned, States have great difficulty with 
re-legislating international law.76 This, as one commentator has written, 
is international law's "missing legislator" problem. 7 Identical difficul-
ties apply to revising a court's mandate. 
For similar reasons, States cannot effectively control courts through 
appointments. Inter-State coordination of nominations and elections 
takes the form of horse-trading and not substantive review. And typi-
cally, judges are nominated and rotated on a geographical basis that has 
no connection ex ante with a judge's views or ex post with a judge's de-
cisions. As Judge Thomas Buergenthal has recently written, "What 
struck me in my re-election campaign is how highly politicized the elec-
tion process is for the various judicial positions that the UN membership 
has to vote for and how little judicial qualifications of the individual 
candidates or their judicial record seem to matter., 78 Even the perma-
nent five members of the Security Council, which traditionally have 
guaranteed seats on some international courts, seldom rotate their 
judges, even when there has been a change in government. Only in ex-
ceptional cases have substantive considerations mattered.79 Judges, 
therefore, have little concern that their decisions will affect their 
chances for reappointment or promotion, and this increases their inde-
pendence while on the bench.80 
overturning Dred Scott v. Sandford,60 U.S. 393 (1857); the Sixteenth Amendment, overturning 
Pollock v. Farmers'Loan& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 
overturning Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). There is, of course, a large literature on 
"conversations" between courts and the legislative and executive branches. See, e.g., Luc B. 
Tremblay, The Legitimacy ofJudicialReview: The Limits ofDialogueBetween CourtsandLegis-
latures, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 617 (2005). 
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey Atik, Democratizingthe WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451, 454 
(2001); Konstantin J. Joergens, True AppellateProcedureor Only a Two-Stage Process?A Com-
parative View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO DisputeSettlement Understanding,30 LAW 
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 193, 213 (1999); Vaughan Lowe, AdvocatingJudicialActivism: The ITLOS 
Opinions ofJudgeIvan Shearer,24 AUSTL.Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 151-52 (2005). 
77. Armin von Bogdandy, Law andPolitics in the WTO--Strategies to Cope with a Deficient 
Relationship,5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 609, 651 (2001). 
78. Buergenthal, Proliferationof Disputes,supra note 28, at 498. 
79. Thus, the majority of the UN General Assembly, unhappy with the ICJ's judgment in the 
South West Africa (Second Phase)case, replaced the judges who voted on the "wrong" side. As a 
consequence, five years later the court's decision was essentially reversed in the Namibia case, 
reflecting a "change of attitude on the part of the Court." See Ram Prakash Anand, Enhancing the 
Acceptability of Compulsory Procedures of InternationalDispute Resolution, 5 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 10 (2001); Edward McWhinney, The InternationalCourtofJustice 
and InternationalLaw-Making: The Judicial Activism/Self-Restraint Antinomy, 5 CHINESE J. 
INT'L L. 3, 10-11 (2006). 
80. See Karen J. Alter, Resolving or ExacerbatingDisputes? The WTO's New DisputeReso-
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Monitoring constraints also mitigate effective control of international 
courts. In domestic systems, we rely upon a host of actors-the gov-
emment, private parties (including practitioners and academics), and the 
media-to monitor and report on judicial activities. In the international 
system, such monitoring devices exist but are much more attenuated or 
non-functional. Thus, even though many (though not all) court sessions 
are open, decisions and opinions are public, and press releases are is-
sued, the media report on only the most high-profile cases (such as that 
of Slobodan Milogevi6) and seldom with any insight.8' Further, even the 
most affluent of States cannot afford the resources to track every action 
of every court. With particularly active courts, such as the ad hoc inter-
national criminal tribunals, it is especially difficult to read and analyze 
the plethora of documents produced. It is true that some States, includ-
ing the United Kingdom and the United States, maintain very small 
staffs in The Hague and Geneva to, among other things, monitor and in-
teract with the tribunals that sit there, but it is still next to impossible to 
digest everything. For the vast majority of States, it is impossible. Even 
the UN Security Council and General Assembly have difficulties.82 One 
might expect States to only truly pay careful attention to courts when 
they participate (or have a direct interest) in a proceeding-for example, 
lution System, 79 INT'L AFF. 783, 795-96 (2003); Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (1999). But see Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and 
Legal Unification-TheAgency Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333, 337-38 (2002) (arguing that the 
limited tenure of international judges makes them less likely to be inventive in ways that upset the 
States that nominate them). Contrast the domestic situation in the United States and Japan: Mark 
A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing 
Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 192-95 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 
JudicialIndependence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidencefrom Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
259 (1997); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Chartingthe Influences on the 
JudicialMind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1487-93 
(1998). 
81. See Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participantsin the InternationalLegal Process, 16 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 21-27 (2006). 
82. See Dominic Raab & Hans Bevers, The InternationalCriminalCourtand the Separation 
ofPowers, 3 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2006) ("Representatives on the Fifth Committee [of 
the General Assembly, which is responsible for budgetary issues,] and the Security Council often 
lack a high level of specific expertise in or experience with criminal courts."). 
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as a party or when subject to orders by a court. 8 3 Much happens, there-
fore, in the absence of oversight. 
84 
But even if a few State officials can get a handle on what is going on, 
it is difficult for a State to react to judicial overreaching. This is not just 
a matter of bureaucracy; it is also a matter of competing policies. Legal 
policy is only one of any number of policies that make up a State's for-
eign policy.85 Thus, even if a State decides that an international tribunal 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or committed an error of law that would 
have a direct effect on that State's international obligations, it is still 
possible that the State would take no corrective action because of other, 
competing policies. For instance, even if the United States took issue 
with a particular ruling of the ICTY, one might wonder whether it 
would attempt to take action against the ICTY because the United States 
is strongly supportive of that institution for foreign policy reasons. The 
same is true of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, though for dif-
ferent reasons. Thus, while the United States has disagreed fundamen-
tally with a number of decisions of the Iran Tribunal, 86 it has not with-
drawn its consent to the Tribunal's jurisdiction (as it could) because 
doing so would potentially have repercussions in the sensitive bilateral 
relations between the two countries. 
C. The Limits ofExternalControls:Inefficiency 
In domestic systems, we have a structure of independent judges 
within a dependent judiciary. 87 Individual judges are provided inde-
pendence but the courts are kept in check by various intermediate con-
trol mechanisms-primarily re-legislating and re-allocation of jurisdic-
tion. Though only occasionally used, such controls are effective because 
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel 
Application for Interview and Testimony of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schr6der (Dec. 9, 2005); 
Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalDecision: Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Decisions on Requests of 
the UnitedStates ofAmerica and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisationfor Review, 101 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 163 (2007). 
84. See, e.g., Raab & Bevers, supra note 82, at 104 (noting how the ICTY's "plea-bargaining 
and sentencing policy more broadly have developed in a rather haphazard manner without inde-
pendent review"). 
85. Cf David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of InternationalCourts and Tribunals, 
24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 409 (2006) (noting that there are often political motives for estab-
lishing international courts). 
86. See, e.g., Iran v. United States, Award No. 529-A15 (II:A and II:B)-FT, Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. (May 6, 1992). 
87. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:ExplainingJudicialInde-
pendence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999). 
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they can be wielded efficiently; hence, they act not only as correctives 
but as deterrents. When combined with internal controls, they can make 
for highly-developed systems of control. 
The same cannot be said for international law, which is mostly a sys-
tem of independent judges within independent courts. Because of the 
limitations on external control mechanisms peculiar to the international 
system, the optimal conditions for their effectiveness do not exist in 
practice, except in limited cases. Courts are most likely to be properly 
controlled when they are supervised by fewer principals, when there are 
opportunities for effective re-legislating, when they are newer, or when 
the stakes are extraordinarily high. Thus, both the NAFTA and the 
WTO contain mechanisms for judicial correction, but only in the case of 
the NAFTA (and not the 150-member WTO) have the three Parties 
agreed to correct a judicial decision. In most cases, international courts 
lack effective supervision because the effects of external mechanisms of 
control-the ones that are used so well in domestic systems-are medi-
ated by the structural limitations of the international system and by the 
principle of judicial independence. As a consequence of the inefficien-
cies of external control mechanisms, international courts, as one com-
mentator has said of the ICTY, largely look after themselves. 
88 
III. CAN INTERNATIONAL COURTS EXERT SELF-CONTROL? 
Commentators focus on external controls on international courts, as if 
those were the only mechanisms that keep judges in check.89 But as im-
portant, if not more important, are internal controls-those checks on 
the operation of the judiciary that are applied by judges to themselves. 90 
In the absence of effective external checks, internal checks are par-
ticularly important because international judges are not simple agents 
applying the law disinterestedly, at least not always. International 
judges, like their domestic counterparts, have interests like anyone 
else.91 These interests are both attitudinal-in the sense of being based 
88. See Raab & Bevers, supra note 82, at 104 (quoting Chris Stephen, Analysis: Setting the 
Hague Record Straight, IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE, no. 300, Feb. 10-15, 2003, 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o= 166536&apcstate= henitri2003). 
89. See, e.g., Danner, supranote 17; Ginsburg, supranote 17; Steinberg, supra note 17. 
90. Cf Ronald A. Cass, Judging:Norms andIncentives ofRetrospective Decision-Making,75 
B.U. L. REv. 941, 969 (1995) ("The hard features of our judicial system...largely are useful in a 
negative sense... .They do not provide positive inducements to behave in a desirable manner...."). 
91. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); Duncan Ken-
nedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
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on ideology or preferred public policy-and personal-in the sense of 
being based on ambition, respect, popularity, and other forms self-
interest. Such interests can run against-and override-the external lim-
its placed upon international courts and judges. Hence the need arises 
not only for effective external controls, but also for effective internal 
controls. 
This Part looks at techniques of judicial self-control and their limits. 
It argues that while there are a number of internal control mechanisms 
that operate on international judges, these are, by their very nature, 
weak. On the other hand, international judges have strong interests of 
their own, and those interests are empowered by the inherent authorities 
of international courts. 
A. InternalControls on InternationalCourts 
Internal controls on international courts are both formal and informal. 
They can be divided into three categories of constraints: professional 
norms, judicial ego, and legal process. 92 All three types of control are 
weak, but they do have their effects and they cannot be ignored. 
Foremost, international judges are limited by the professional norms 
associated with their office, primarily independence and impartiality.93 
Though such norms exist as a necessary consequence of a judge's elec-
tion, "for [a new] international judge to conduct himself in an impartial 
and independent way," writes Judge Theodor Meron, "may require ad-
aptation and discipline." 94 As part of this process, the statutes of most 
international courts require that judges, before they take their seats, 
make a solemn declaration 95 that is designed to impart notions of impar-
518 (1986); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges andJustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Eve-
rybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, 
and the Inglorious Determinants ofJudicialBehavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000). My discus-
sion of judicial self-interest relies a good deal on work done in the U.S. context by, among others, 
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
(2006); Cass, supra note 90; and Schauer, supra. 
92. Though some of the restrictions noted in this Section are (or might be considered) also 
"external" controls, I refer to them here insofar as they are applied by judges to themselves. 
93. These norms are seldom specified in any detail. The Code of Judicial Ethics, adopted by 
the judges of the International Criminal Court, is an exception. See Code of Judicial Ethics, ICC-
BD/02-01-05 (Mar. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ICC-BD02-01-05_En.pdf. 
94. Meron, supranote 12, at 360. 
95. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 20 ("Every 
member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court 
that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously."); Rome Statute of the Interna-
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tiality and conscientiousness to the persons taking the oath-in other 
words to appeal to their "internal compass." 96 To bolster their effect, 
oaths are administered publicly. This is intended to suggest to the judge 
that he or she is publicly accountable in the event of a failure to abide 
by judicial norms of conduct. It is also intended to satisfy the audience 
that the judge will act in accordance with the norms expected of him or 
her. Professional norms thus act upon judges in two ways: as a reminder 
of agreed judicial standards and as a reminder of the possible conse-
quences resulting from the failure to abide by those standards. 
Judges also enjoy adulation and care about the prestige of their of-
fice, and this too might limit their actions. Judges might be concerned 
about their popularity with particular groups-such as members of the 
international bar, international law academics, and nongovernmental or-
ganizations-for reasons of ego (wanting to be respected), influence, 
and even monetary rewards (for example, by being appointed an arbitra-
tor in international arbitrations). 97 They might care about their reputa-
tion among their colleagues, both on their own court and on other inter-
national courts, also for reasons of ego and influence.98 In these and 
other ways, international judges have been said to be a part of a "global 
community of law" that restricts their decision-making. 99 Finally, inter-
national judges care about whether their decisions will be complied with 
by States (both the parties to the case and non-parties) and whether 
States may withdraw their consent from the Court's jurisdiction, and 
this may affect their decision-making too.'
00 
tional Criminal Court, supra note 33, art. 45; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, supra note 37, art. 11; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 14, IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev39e.pdf; Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 14 (June 7, 2005), available at 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISHIrules/070605/070605.pdf. 
96. Cass, supranote 90, at 978. 
97. See Posner, supra note 91, at 13-15. Stephen Schwebel, former judge and president of the 
International Court of Justice, was a member of more than two dozen arbitral panels during his 
career on the court. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT ET AL., LEGAL OPINION ON GUATEMALA'S TER-
RITORIAL CLAIM TO BELIZE 1 (2001), http://www.mfa.gov.bz/library/documents/ LegalOpinio-
non.pdf. 
98. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1014, 1046 (2007). 
99. Heifer & Slaughter, supranote 17, at 953; see also Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College 
ofInternationalLawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 217 (1977); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Com-
munity ofCourts, 44 HARV.INT'L L.J. 191 (2003). 
100. Thus, in some circumstances, it appears that judges and arbitrators have issued decisions 
that were designed to avoid noncompliance by one of the parties to the dispute. See, e.g., United 
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Judges are restricted, as well, in a number of technical and procedural 
ways. As a formal matter, they are restricted by the jurisdictional and 
other limits imposed by States in a court's mandate. They are also lim-
ited by the texts of the agreements they apply, as well as by precedent 
and other sources of law, including interpretative rules. 101 The require-
ment that a court give reasoned, public opinions10 2 that are in accor-
dance with law can also set limits to a judge's decision-making.10 3 And 
some courts, such as the international criminal tribunals and the WTO, 
include multi-judge panels and forms of appellate or quasi-appellate re-
view in order to decrease the possibility of partiality and error.' 
04 
B. Limitationson Internal Controls 
There are, thus, a number of ways in which judges can constrain or 
are constrained by themselves. But there are a number of factors, some 
unique and some not unique to the international system, that work in fa-
vor of judicial discretion. Indeed, some of the internal constraints on 
judging can in fact cut in favor of activism, and other internal con-
straints, such as giving reasoned opinions, are not necessarily effec-
tive. 0 5 There are two general types of limits on internal controls: the 
personal and institutional interests of judges and the institutional author-
ity of courts. 
States v. Iran, Decision No. DEC 132-A33-FT, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. (Sept. 9, 2004); United States 
v. Iran, Decision No. DEC 130-A28-FT, Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. (Dec. 19, 2000). In domestic systems, 
lower court judges who desire promotion have the related anxiety of possible reversal by a higher 
court. See Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: EmpiricalEvidence From Antitrust Sentenc-
ing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992). 
101. This can be true, even though, as a formal matter, international judges are not bound by 
prior decisions. See, e.g., MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 
(1996). 
102. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 33, art. 56(1) ("The 
judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based."); Statute of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, supranote 37, art. 30(1) (same). 
103. See Frederick Schauer, GivingReasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (1995). 
104. See, e.g., Peter Van den Bossche, FromAfterthought to Centrepiece: The WTO Appel-
late Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 289, 292-94 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan 
Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006). 
105. Reasons can easily cover a self-interested decision. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent 
Deceptiveness of ConstitutionalDiscourse: A Diagnosisand Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND 
CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998). On the failure of the International 
Court of Justice to give reasons in one case, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli 
Wall Advisory Opinion:An Ipse Dixitfrom the ICJ?,99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005). 
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Like all judges, international judges have a variety of personal and 
institutional interests that overlap with or derive from their professional 
roles. They have views about public policy; they have opinions regard-
ing the role of courts and judges; and they have concerns about their 
reputations and popularity. 10 6 These interests cohere into a tendency, as 
Karen Alter has written, for judges to "promot[e] [judicial] independ-
ence, influence, and authority."' 1 7 Thus, judges seek independence and 
autonomy from political bodies, and they seek to increase the relevance 
of their decisions. 0 8 They also tend to advocate expanding the power of 
the law, as by doing so they also expand their own power.'0 9 
Given the structure of the international system, with its gaps, ambi-
guities, deficient legislative process, and weak enforcement mecha-
nisms, these inclinations-and the opportunities to act on them-are 
even greater for international judges. As a result, international judges 
often believe in the "development of international law"'10 or, as Judge 
Jennings put it, "the scientific development of general international 
' law."' Knowing how difficult it is for States to fill the gaps, they see it 
as their responsibility to do so by putting their "imprimatur" on such 
development."l 2 Judge Jennings wrote approvingly, "It is probable that 
in view of the difficulties surrounding the codification of international 
law, international tribunals will in the future fulfill, inconspicuously but
' 13 
efficiently, a large part of the task of developing international law."" 
Judge Koroma, referring to this prediction, commented, "I believe that's 
what we try to do."'"1 4 Judge Simma of the International Court of Jus-
106. See generally BAUM, supranote 91. 
107. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING 
OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 45 (2001). 
108. See id. at 45-46. 
109. See John 0. McGinnis, The Limits of InternationalLaw in ProtectingDignity, 27 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 141 (2003) (arguing that international court judges expand their own au-
thority by expanding the authority of international law); Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic andLimits 
of Partners' Liability in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 63 (1997) (noting that bank-
ruptcy judges decide cases in ways that expand their authority). 
110. NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 137 (1989). 
111. Robert Jennings, The Role of the InternationalCourtofJustice in the Development of In-
ternationalEnvironment ProtectionLaw, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY. & INT'L EmVT'L L. 240, 242 
(1992), quoted in Reisman, supranote 32, at 52. 
112. Jennings, supra note 11l, at 241. 
113. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 
1992). 
114. Abdul G. Koroma, InternationalCourts and Tribunals: Alternatives to Treaty Making, 
in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 621, 625 (Riudiger Wolfrum & 
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tice, writing in two recent judgments, complained about the "inappro-
priate self-restraint" and the "unnecessarily cautious way[s]" of his col-
leagues 1 5 and Judge ad hoc Shearer argued in an opinion that it was for 
the ITLOS to strike "[a] new 'balance"' in the law since "circumstances 
have now changed."'"16 International judges are also believers in the 
power of international law and adjudication. The courts through their 
decisions can, some judges claim, "secur[e] the promotion of interna-
tional peace and security and the development of friendly relations be-
tween States." ' 1 7 Thus, like constitutional court judges, international 
court judges "seek both to preserve the normative superiority of [inter-
national law] and to ensure that [international law] becomes, or contin-
ues to be, the essential reference point for the settlement of like cases1 8 
that may arise in the future."' 
Courts and judges not only have their own interests; they also have 
their own authorities. They initially have (some) authority because it 
was given to them by States. But they have other kinds of authorities-
independent of what State's bestow upon them-by virtue of their ex-
pertise and the legitimacy inherent in their judicial role." 9 International 
courts, therefore, have "the ability...to use institutional and discursive 
resources to induce deference from others."' 20 That ability is based in 
their missions, their goals, and their methods, the ways in which they go 
about achieving those goals. With such abilities, international courts can 
use their authority to regulate current and future behavior by States and 
other actors. In so doing, they potentially can go beyond what States 
have delegated to them, as, once established, international courts have 
Volker Rbben eds., 2005). 
115. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 327 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge 
Simma); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Lexis 7 
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Simma). 
116. The "Volga" Case (No. 11) (Russ. v. Austl.), 42 I.L.M. 159, 196 (Int'l Trib. L. of the 
Sea 2002) (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer), available at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. 
117. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 121 (Nov. 12) 
(joint dissenting opinion of Judges Aguilar Mawdsley and Ranjeva), quoted in Reisman, supra 
note 32, at 53. 
118. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE 141 (2000). 
119. See, e.g., Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers ofInternationalCourtsand Tribunals, 76 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 195 (2005); Mich~le Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, When the Statute and 
Rules Are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 65 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001). 
120. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 5 (2004). 
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authorities independent of that delegation. These powers can be substan-
tial,12' as the European Court of Justice's construction of its own author-22 
ity and its transformation of the EU legal system demonstrates. 
C. The Limits ofInternal Controls:MoralHazard 
Judicial independence acts like insurance, decreasing the risk to 
judges (the insured) of repercussions for their decisions on the bench. 
The advantages of insurance (and independence), though, can also have 
attendant costs, namely moral hazard, in which the insured's behavior 
changes to such an extent that the associated risks and losses increase 
substantially because their costs no longer accrue to the insured. 123 
Thus, judicial independence (and the ineffectiveness of external controls 
generally) allows judges the freedom to pursue their own interests, sub-
ject only to internal controls. 
And even more so than their domestic colleagues, international 
judges have interests that make them inherent judicial expansionists, as 
well as authorities that provide them the opportunities to implement 
those predilections. Believers in the power of law, international judges 
see it as their duty to use the courts to develop international law and to 
consolidate the international rule of law. Internal controls have their ef-
fects-judges feel compelled to decide cases under the law, as a matter 
of substance and process. But internal controls, which are naturally 
weak as they depend on self-control, can only counter these tendencies 
so much. Law, particularly international law, is malleable, and judges 
have great discretion. While international judges, of course, are not en-
tirely free agents, they are hardly opinionless automatons either. 
121. Especially when combined with the ability of courts to act incrementally over a long pe-
riod of time. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Stability andChange in JudicialDecision-Making:Incre-
mentalism or StareDecisis?, 2 LAW TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965). 
122. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Mastersof the Treaty"?: EuropeanGovernments 
and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121 (1998); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. 
Brunell, Constructing a SupranationalConstitution:Dispute Resolution and Governance in the 
European Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 74 (1998); Alec Stone Sweet & James A. 
Caporaso, From Free Trade to SupranationalPolity: The European Court and Integration, in 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 92 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec 
Stone Sweet eds., 1998); cf Shoaib A. Ghias, InternationalJudicialLawmaking: A Theoretical 
andPoliticalAnalysis of the WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 534 (2006). 
123. Cf REISMAN, supranote 7, at 8. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard,75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
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IV. COMPETITION AND CONTROL 
States are not unaware of the importance and fragility ofjudicial con-
trol mechanisms. For example, during the Security Council debates on 
the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, some States put down 
markers for the new courts. Thus, the representative of Venezuela stated 
that the ICTY, "as a subsidiary organ of the Council, would not be em-
powered with-nor would the Council be assuming-the ability to set 
down norms of international law or to legislate with respect to those 
rights. It simply applies existing international humanitarian law.', 124 And 
the representative of Argentina indicated that the ICTR "is not author-
ized to establish rules of international law or to legislate as regards such 
' law but, rather, it is to apply existing international law."1 25 This was 
also a concern of the drafters of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing, who embedded in that agreement the rule that 
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the D[ispute] S[ettlement] B[ody] 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the cov-
ered agreements."' 126 And as we have seen, the drafters of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court went to great lengths to re-
duce judicial discretion by drafting detailed Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence and Elements of Crimes and all but eliminating judicial rule-
making. As States have created more courts, and noticed the flaws of 
existing courts, they have become increasingly interested in controlling 
courts ab initio. 
But, as the above analysis indicates, these attempts will ultimately be 
ineffectual. Like international organizations generally, 27 international 
courts have minds and interests of their own. As a result, they can be 
tempted to expand their powers beyond those provided for in their con-
stitutive documents or by informal expectations. At the same time, in-
ternational courts are protected from external control because of the 
124. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (state-
ment of Mr. Arria, representative ofVenezuela). It is true that the ad hoc tribunals can create their 
own rules and that those rules influence the outcome of cases, but that does not mean that the Se-
curity Council delegated lawmaking authority to those courts. 
125. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (state-
ment of Ms. Cafias, representative of Argentina). 
126. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 2 (Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes), art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1226, 1227. 
127. See, e.g., BARNETT & FtNNEMORE, supra note 120 (discussing the autonomy and author-
ity of secretariats of international organizations). 
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principle of judicial independence and because of structural constraints 
on international lawmaking and institutional reform. This combination 
of weak external control and imperfect self-control provides interna-
tional courts with opportunities to exceed their mandates. Though the 
likelihood of this occurring varies by court (and even by case), there 
should be no doubt that international judges not only have the opportu-
nity and the tools, 128 but, on occasion, the willingness to do this as 
well. 129 
Traditional mechanisms of control are imperfect because they fail to 
effectively act upon the needs of courts and judges to maintain their in-
fluence and authority. If judges have little reason to worry about exter-
nal controls-that their decisions will affect their chances for reelection; 
that their rulings will be overturned legislatively; that their mandates 
will not operate perpetually; that their rulings will not diminish the 
number of cases on their docket-then they have little incentive to 
check their own actions. This is why those who are troubled by the 
breakdown of control have often looked to internal controls, suggesting 
that international judges be better attuned to their unique roles and exert 
greater self-control. 130 Yet, as these same commentators acknowledge, 
self-control is a weak hook upon which to hang international dispute 
resolution. What is needed are controls that are tailored to and take ad-
vantage of the structure of the international system as it exists today and 
the various intersecting incentives and capacities created by that struc-
ture. 
Because of the strong judicial desire to have a positive role in the in-
ternational legal order, the most effective controls on judges, therefore, 
will play on that need. And the best way to do that is by restricting, or 
threatening to restrict, the main vehicle for judicial influence: cases. In 
other words, international judges are most likely to exert self-control if 
128. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, ConstitutionalismLite, I INT'L ORG. L. REV. 31, 37-41 (2004) 
(describing the doctrines of conferred powers, functional necessity, and ultra vires that judges use 
to expand their powers). 
129. See, e.g., REISMAN, supranote 7, at 11 -45 (describing the breakdown of informal juris-
dictional limits at the ICJ); Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US-Zeroing:A Study in JudicialOver-
reachingby the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 196 (2006) (concluding 
that, in a recent case, "the Appellate Body inappropriately expanded the WTO's authority to hear 
facial challenges"). 
130. See REISMAN, supra note 7, at 143; Lorand Bartels, The Separation ofPowers in the 
WTO: How to Avoid JudicialActivism, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 861 (2004); J. Patrick Kelly, Ju-
dicial Activism at the World Trade Organization:DevelopingPrinciplesofSelf-Restraint, 22 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 353 (2002). 
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they can envision harms to their core self-interests by failing to do so. A 
system of competitive adjudication provides such a mechanism. 
A. CompetitiveAdjudication 
Which brings us back to consent and decision control. The easiest 
and most effective way for States to control courts is to limit their abil-
ity to decide cases, by actions taken either ex ante or ex post. This is 
usually viewed negatively, as States opting out of the international legal 
system. But there is potentially a positive side to decision control, too, 
for a State's refusal to consent to a court's jurisdiction or a State's with-
drawal from that jurisdiction communicates to the court that that State is 
unsatisfied with the quality of the court's work. 131 States have an inter-
est, among other things, 32 in finding courts that provide them with "un-
'biased, accurate, reasonable, and prompt resolution of disputes,"' 33 and 
failing that, they can and sometimes do withdraw. If enough States (or 
important enough States) did this, then a court might lose its customer 
base, and without customers, a court could slide into irrelevance and 
maybe even shut down. Though international judges are not as depend-
ent on litigants as pre-nineteenth-century English judges, whose salaries 
were based on the fees they received, they will still be solicitous of the 
needs of States, except in certain circumstances (noted below), in order 
to maintain their standing, prestige, and influence in the international 
legal order. 134 Faced with losing market share (and its potential conse-
quences) because States withdraw from or refuse to accede to their ju-
risdiction, courts-like any supplier of goods and services-will look to 
reinvent themselves as more customer-friendly. 135 
This process of evaluation and re-evaluation is enhanced when a 
State has multiple fora to choose from when submitting a dispute to ad-
131. I leave aside here the issue of noncompliance. 
132. Of course, litigants usually seek out a forum that will be biased in their favor; hence, fo-
rum shopping. But where litigants do not have free choice of fora, that is, when the forum de-
pends on a mutual choice ofplaintiff and defendant, as in the international arena, the interests of 
the parties shift to these more neutral criteria. For a general discussion of factors States might 
consider, see Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both? DisputeSettlement in the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdic-
tions, 13 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 246-65 (2004). 
133. Zywicki, supranote 1,at 1585. 
134. See id at 1587-88; Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Privateand Public Judges, 41 
PUB.CHOICE 107, 129 (1983). 
135. Cf Cooter, supra note 134, at 107 ("[S]ome private judges have to attract business, so 
they are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who sells a service."). 
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judication. The ability of States to choose among courts or to forego 
them entirely and the desire of courts to adjudicate cases and adjust their 
procedures to attract litigants together generate the incentives and dy-
namics for competitive adjudication. Courts will endeavor to make 
rules-both procedural and substantive-that accord with the interests 
of States, and courts will monitor the decisions of their competitors (and 
how they are received) in order to decide whether to adopt those innova-
tions themselves. In this way, competition among courts can create ef-
fective control. 1
36 
The market for international legal services can serve as an effective 
control mechanism not only because it creates incentives for courts to 
mediate their actions in order to attract litigants, but also because the 
system, as constructed, does not establish a bias in favor of a particular 
set of litigants, plaintiffs or defendants.1 37 The dangers of forum shop-
ping are, therefore, diminished considerably. Not all competitive sys-
tems are so evenhanded. In the United States, for example, state long-
arm statutes and choice-of-law rules allow plaintiffs in class-action tort 
litigation to unilaterally choose their forum, and elected state judiciaries 
have incentives to favor these plaintiffs, thereby creating a pro-plaintiff 
bias in certain jurisdictions. 38 In the international system, plaintiffs do 
not have this choice, as the consent of both parties is required as a basis 
for jurisdiction, and plaintiffs must choose their forum with the fore-
knowledge that they may be subject to the same rules as a potential fu-
ture defendant. Thus, as with arbitrators in international commercial ar-
bitration, international judges "have strong incentives to make decisions 
that make both parties to the case, ex ante, better off.' 13 9 
In some ways, international dispute resolution has always been a 
competitive system. States had their choice of fora, whether it was the 
136. Ruth Wedgwood has suggested a system of "competitive multilateralism" that would 
lead to reform of international organizations, such as the United Nations. See Ruth Wedgwood, 
Editorial, Give the UnitedNationsa Little Competition,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at A23. 
137. This is in contrast to the pre-nineteenth-century English legal system. See, e.g., Daniel 
Klerman, JurisdictionalCompetition and the Evolution of the Common Law (Univ. of S.Cal. 
CLEO, Research Paper No. C07-4, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-968701. 
138. See Todd J.Zywicki, Is Forum-ShoppingCorruptingAmerica's Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1154-57 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How 
COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)). 
139. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International 
CommercialArbitration,33 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 107 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 
Cooter, supra note 134, at 131 ("Private judges who maximize demand for their services from 
disputants, each of whom has the power to veto choice of a judge, will make decisions which are 
pairwise Pareto efficient...."). 
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ICJ (or its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice) or 
ad hoc arbitral tribunals. Sometimes, because of the nature of the dis-
pute, only one forum-permanent or ad hoc-was available. But mostly 
States had their pick and opted for the forum that best suited their 
needs. 40 Thus, for example, States have variously resorted to the ICJ 
1and ad hoc arbitration to resolve their maritime boundary disputes. 
14 
That said, the proliferation of courts, principally over the past fifteen 
years, has expanded the possibilities for competition significantly. Ad 
hoc tribunals are fine, but, in the end, competition is enhanced by more 
permanent institutions because permanent judges-given the length of 
their tenure and the permanency of their courts-have greater incentives 
to maintain their status positions and influences than do arbitrators and 
because more permanent courts create a greater range of choices for 
litigants. 
Competition has also increased because of a proliferation of treaties 
that institutionalize a framework of competitive adjudication. 42 The 
best example of such entrenched competition is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 287 of UNCLOS 
provides for compulsory dispute settlement of certain disputes but al-
lows parties to the Convention to choose between four different types of 
dispute resolution: the ITLOS, the ICJ, and two types of arbitration. 14
3 
The default (in cases where a State has not chosen a preferred forum ex 
140. On why States may prefer arbitration over adjudication, see Loretta Malintoppi, Methods 
ofDispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go to ArbitrationRather Than Adju-
dication, 5 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 133 (2006). 
141. See Charney, supra note 28, at 315. 
142. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 30, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 
3, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1569-70; Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 19, 
Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1468; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities arts. 56-57, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (not in force); United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. A number 
of trade agreements give the parties the choice of fora, including the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, when a dispute arises under both the agreement and the WTO agreements. See, e.g., Olivos 
Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur art. 1(2), Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2; 
NAFTA, supra note 48, art. 2005. See Pauwelyn, supra note 132, at 270-77. Nonbinding dispute 
settlement provisions that include choice of fora include the Convention on Biological Diversity 
art. 27, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 31 I.L.M. 818; the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change art. 14, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 11, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1533-34; and the Conven-
tion on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art. 25, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 
3476, 19 I.L.M. 841. 
143. See UNCLOS, supranote 142, art. 287. 
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ante or where States have not consented to the same forum) is to one of 
the two forms of arbitration. 144 Because States can alter their dispute 
resolution choice at any time prior to a dispute or can agree ad hoc to 
one of the four dispute resolution mechanisms, the Convention imbeds 
competition. 145 This system of choice was established because the States 
negotiating the Convention could not agree upon a single method of ad-
judication, 146 and the resulting approach makes it more likely that States 
that are considering ratifying the Convention will not be put off by the 
Convention's compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. 147 As a result 
of this competition, States may forum shop and tribunals may seek to 
make themselves more amenable to perceived State preferences.' 
48 
Competition among tribunals is not purely theoretical. Alain Pellet, 
who has appeared many times as counsel before the ICJ and other inter-
national tribunals, noted recently that "[p]arties have the impression that 
the political, financial and human efforts involved in their consent to 
bring a case to the World Court are not compensated and they therefore 
turn toward other fora, which are perhaps less prestigious, but just as ef-
fective."' 149 And the impact of this competitive framework is already 
evident in the acts of courts and in the public statements of judges. 
Older institutions have updated their rules to make them more user-
friendly. 150 And the practices or powers of one court-such as the au-
144. See id art. 287(5). 
145. See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea 
andthe InternationalCourtofJustice,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 809, 817 (1999). 
146. See 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 
41-45 (Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989); NATALIE KLEIN, 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 54 (2005); Shabtai 
Rosenne, UNCLOS III-The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING: 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGEN 169 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo 
Siblesz eds., 1986). 
147. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding InternationalDispute Settle-
ment Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (1996). 
148. See, e.g., Donald L. Morgan, Implications of the Proliferationof InternationalLegal 
Fora:The Exampleof the SouthernBluefin Tuna Cases, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 541, 550-51 (2002) 
(explaining why ITLOS's procedural practices, such as expediency, and interpretations of sub-
stantive law, such as the precautionary principle, might make it an attractive forum for certain 
States). 
149. Alain Pellet, Remarks on ProceedingsBefore the InternationalCourt of Justice,5 LAW 
& PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 163, 181-82 (2006). 
150. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0; International Court of Justice, Practice Direc-
tions, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=4&p3=0; Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/2STATENG.pdf; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbi-
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thority to issue binding provisional measures and the use of law 
clerks-are being reviewed, 15 1 adopted, 52 and sought 153 by other courts 
in the hope that incorporating those techniques will make them more at-
tractive to potential litigants (or at least as attractive as their competi-
tors). As Rosalyn Higgins, current President of the International Court 
of Justice, has written, the "important task for the Court is.. .to ensure 
that it can respond as efficaciously as possible to its clientele."1 54 In 
these ways, international tribunals are beginning to act like much like 
the providers of private international dispute resolution. 155 
B. Limitations on CompetitiveAdjudication 
Competitive adjudication works, though, only if judges feel the need 
to compete. Consequently, when courts are guaranteed sufficient busi-
ness (that is, when courts have exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction 
and when States have no option but to accede to that jurisdiction), they 
will not yield to the pressures of competition. This is the problem of ju-
dicial monopoly. For example, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) has compulsory jurisdiction over the member states of the 
Council of Europe (COE) for violations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The only mechanism of exit from the Court's jurisdic-
tion is withdrawal from the COE, which is not a desirable option for 
most States. Consequently, the ECHR has no effective competition.156 
tration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=590. 
151. See, e.g., Annual Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Seafor 2006, 
31, SPLOS/152 (Mar. 23, 2007) ("[T]he Tribunal followed closely the developments of the rules 
of procedure of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals."). 
152. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27) (holding that 
provisional measures issued by the court are binding); Romano, supranote 55, at 288. 
153. See, e.g., Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int'l Court of Justice, Speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr-1874&pt=3&pl =l&p2=3&p3=l ("Quite simply, the International 
Court of Justice can no longer provide the service that Member States bringing cases desire if it, 
as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, is denied what is routinely accorded to every 
other senior court."). 
154. Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign StatesandRunninga Tight Courtroom,50 INT'L 
& CoMP. L.Q. 121, 123 (2001). 
155. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 139, at 99-102; John Selby, Competitive Justice?: The 
Role of Dispute Resolution Providers Under ICANN's UDRP, 1 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 23 
(2004). 
156. At most, it engages in a dialogue with other international human rights courts. See Anto-
nio Augusto Caneado Trindade, The Merits of Coordinationof InternationalCourts on Human 
Rights, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 309 (2004). 
                                                                                                        
   
        
     
          
    
 
         
            
         
       
             
        
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
445 2008] COMPETITION AND CONTROL So, too, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which-in the wake of two recent efforts by Member States to adjudicate claims by ad hoc ar­bitration-declared last year that it had, by virtue of Article 292 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 157 "exclusive jurisdic­tion ... in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation and application of Community law." 158 EU Member States are therefore prohibited from bringing disputes to courts and tribunals other than the ECJ when a question of European law is at issue (and the Court has given a wide interpretation of what constitutes European law). In monopolistic systems, such as these and others, 159competitive adjudication will not succeed, and so the only way to effec­tively control such courts is through the re-writing of the rules ( or the threat of re-writing the rules) or noncompliance (or the threat of non­compliance).160Similarly, competition will also fail if a court is captured by a group of States who, amongst themselves, provide the court with the necessary business to maintain its docket. This is the problem of monopsony.161 
157. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 292, Nov. 10, 1997, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
I (as amended on Feb. 26, 2001). 
158. Case C-459/03, Comm'n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4635, ,i 132. See generally Nikolaos
Lavranos, Protecting Its Exclusive Jurisdiction: The MOX Plant-Judgment of the ECJ, 5 LAW & 
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 479 (2006). This approach accords with the ECJ's refusal to give 
direct effect to WTO Appellate Body decisions. See Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999 
E.C.R. 1-8395, ,i 47; Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. Belgisch lnterventie- en Restitutiebureau, 2005
E.C.R. 1-1465, ,i 48. See generally Nikolaos Lavranos, The Communitarization of WTO Dispute
Settlement Reports: An Exception to the Rule of Law, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 313 (2005).
159. Other courts with exclusive jurisdiction include the Caribbean Court of Justice and the
Court of Justice of the Andean Community. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of 
Justice art. XII(!), Feb. 14, 2001, available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/ courtad­
ministration/ccj_agreement.pdf; Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community 
(as amended by the Cochabamba Protocol) art. 42, May 28, 1996, 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/lNGLES/normativa/ande_trie2.htm. Two WTO dispute settle­
ment reports-one by a panel and one by the Appellate Body-have interpreted Article 23(1) of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as providing for exclusive jurisdiction under the 
DSU of disputes regarding WTO rights and obligations. See Appellate Body Report, United 
States-Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, ,i 111, 
WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, ,1,17.35, 7.43, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
160. On the possibility of re-writing EU law to "correct" ECJ decisions, see MARK A.
POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA 
SETTING IN THE EU 200-02 (2003); Tallberg, supra note 13, at 31; and George Tsebelis & 
Geof­frey Garrett, The Institutional Foundations of lntergovernmentalism and Supranationalism 
in the European Union, 55 INT'L ORG. 357 (2001). 
161. A related phenomenon is oligopsony, in which the number of buyers (here States or 
groups of States consenting to the jurisdiction of international courts) is too few to sustain a com-
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Indeed, it has been suggested that, at least since the 1980s, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has been captured by a group of States.' 62 Fi-
nally, competition will fail if there is collusion among the suppliers of 
international adjudication-international courts-which would estab-
lish, in effect, a monopolistic system. 
C. The Limits of Competitive Adjudication:Market Failure 
Competitive adjudication will work, therefore, only when competi-
tive conditions obtain. In cases of monopoly, monopsony, or collusion, 
control will be difficult to achieve through competition, and market 
failure will result. Judicial monopolies may be appropriate in domestic 
systems and in highly integrated regional systems, such as Europe, 
where controls may be more effectively wielded. 163 But forms of judi-
cial monopolies will impair the possibilities for international judicial 
dispute resolution because they hamper the control that comes with 
competition among courts. 
How then should market failure be combated? How should competi-
tion among international courts be facilitated? In domestic systems, mo-
nopolistic tendencies in business are controlled either through antitrust 
laws or, in the case of natural monopolies (such as public utilities), price 
regulation. For international adjudication, the equivalent of price regula-
tions are external controls, such as detailed rule-making-the inherent 
difficulties of which we have already noted. But there are other tech-
niques-akin to antitrust law-to entrench competition among courts, 
and these are discussed below. 
V. CONCLUSION: COHERENCE AND COMPETITION 
The international system needs more not fewer mechanisms for dis-
pute resolution. Consequently, when judicial controls have broken down 
or are ineffective, there is the need to repair them. Like all types of re-
form, control regeneration is difficult but not inconceivable. In the con-
petitive market. 
162. See REISMAN, supra note 7, at 44. 
163. Though, of course, even in some domestic systems judicial competition does exist, for 
example, among U.S. bankruptcy jurisdictions and (possibly) among the state courts for corporate 
litigation. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 138 (evaluating the benefits of competition among bank-
ruptcy courts). But see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth ofState Competition in 
CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 708-15 (2002) (providing a skeptical account of judicial 
competition for corporate cases). 
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text of international courts, control reform must take into account judi-
cial independence and, to be effective, must also be sensitive to the 
structural constraints inherent in the international system. Competition 
accomplishes this by ensuring that the needs of courts and their judges 
are linked with the needs of States. Competition is not only an innocu-
ous means of control; it is also a valuable technique for the creation of 
better rules and more efficient courts. 
Many have worried, though, that competition (and conflicts) among 
courts will lead to incoherence and unpredictability in the law and that 
will undermine the authority of the international legal system, which, so 
it is feared, is already short on credibility. 164 Jurisdictional overlap, in 
the words of one commentator, "causes a host of problems such as legal 
uncertainty for the parties, endless proceedings through forum-shopping 
and re-litigation of the same dispute before different courts and tribu-
nals, creation of 'self-contained' regimes, fragmentation of international 
law, and, ultimately, deterioration of the authority of dispute settlement 
mechanisms."' 65 If we care about international courts and international 
law, the argument goes, we should do what we can to reduce, if not 
eliminate, conflict among courts. 
Those who worry about incoherence propose two types of mecha-
nisms to resolve such conflicts. The first imagines a hierarchical judicial 
system, such as by making the ICJ a court of appeal, giving the ICJ the 
authority to render preliminary rulings (modeled on the ECJ), extending 
the ICJ's advisory jurisdiction, or creating a Tribunal des Conflits 
(modeled on the French system for resolving disputes between the Con-
seil d'Etat and the Cour de Cassation). 166 This is highly unlikely to oc-
cur. The second is based on judicial comity, res judicata, lis pendens, 
and other "system-protective doctrines" to be created and implemented 
by judges. 167 Because "there is no central judicial authority [in interna-
164. See, e.g., SHANY, supra note 29, at 94, 125-26; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of 
Fragmentationor Unification of the InternationalLegal System and the InternationalCourt of 
Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791 (1999); Emst-Ulich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict 
Resolution: Proliferation,Fragmentation,andDecentralizationof DisputeSettlement in Interna-
tional Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 366 (2006). 
165. Nikolaos Lavranos, The MOX Plant and UIzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Su-
preme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 223, 242 (2006). 
166. Id. at 243-45; see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment TreatyAr-
bitration:PrivatizingPublicInternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1521, 1617-25 (2005) (recommending the creation of an Investment Arbitration Appellate 
Court). 
167. See SHANY, supra note 29, at 278; Lavranos, supranote 165, at 245-46; Martinez, supra 
note 29, at 448; August Reinisch, The Use and Limits ofRes Judicata andLis Pendens as Proce-
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tional law] which can impose order over the entire field so as to secure 
unity in the overall development of the law," Judge Shahabuddeen has 
written, "there is a legal duty [on judges] to take account of the need for 
coherence in the whole field."'168 Such judicial "self-organizing," it is 
claimed, "is almost certainly a necessary precondition" of "an interna-
tional judicial system that functions well in all situations." 169 
But coherence, predictability, and order, though certainly desirable, 
prioritize style over substance, form over outcome. 170 Most importantly, 
coherence presupposes a legal system that contains adequate control 
mechanisms. Without adequate control mechanisms, however, a well-
regulated system will not be a well-subscribed system. Coherence is a 
luxury afforded to us by control. 
Further, competition and coherence are not necessarily in tension. It 
is entirely possible that, after an initial period of competition in a par-
ticular substantive area, coherent rules will emerge,'17 and, indeed, this 
has been the case in some areas of law.' 72 When coherent rules have not 
emerged-such as with the law of State responsibility for the acts of ir-
regular forces'73 -it may be due, in fact, to the absence of effective 
competition. 
dural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlment Outcomes, 3 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & 
TRIBUNALS 37 (2004); Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Consistency in Holdings by InternationalTri-
bunals, in I LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 633 (Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney & 
Rfldiger Wolfrum eds., 2002). 
168. Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, 25, 28 (May 31, 2000) 
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). 
169. Martinez, supra note 29, at 448. This is an empirical assertion, which is belied by the 
historical record of competitive systems of adjudication and the existence in contemporary soci-
ety of forms of competition among courts. See, e.g., Zywicki, supranote 138. 
170. Some may also oppose competition precisely because it places limits on the autonomy of 
the international judiciary. On this theory, autonomous courts are desirable because they more 
effectively promote the international rule of law. This view is misplaced because it assumes that 
States will sign up for such courts. A corollary fear is that competition among courts will lead to a 
race to the bottom. But that is unlikely as that would undercut the usefulness of international ad-
judication to States and also because, as discussed previously, international judges are, on the 
whole, part of a culture that would resist such tendencies. 
171. Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and MoralHazardin ForumShopping: 
ConflictsLaw as SpontaneousOrder,25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1391-92 (2004). 
172. See, e.g., Charney, supranote 28, at 345. 
173. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 145 (July 15, 1999) 
(adopting an "overall control" test and rejecting the approach of the ICJ in Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)), with Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), General List No.91, 2007 I.C.J. _, 391, 406 (Feb. 26) (adhering to 
the "effective control" test ofNicar v. U.S., supra, and refusing to follow the ICTY's Tadi deci-
sion). 
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Finally, critics of competition confuse competition among courts to 
attract litigants (competitive adjudication) with conflicts among courts 
that may stem from multiple filings in different courts regarding the 
same dispute (parallel proceedings). 174 It may be appropriate to restrict 
parties to a dispute to a single filing in one jurisdiction, and conse-
quently, it may be appropriate for courts to defer to another jurisdiction 
where a case has already been filed. Indeed, treaties that allow for com-
petitive adjudication usually also limit parties to a single filing in one 
forum. 175 Thus, the potential problem of overlapping jurisdiction over 
the same case is not a necessary result of (and consequently is not a 
valid objection to) competitive adjudication. 
If competition is the priority, then States and courts should think less 
about "system-protective" devices and more about competition-
enhancing techniques. In negotiating treaties, States should incorporate 
dispute resolution provisions, like those in the UNCLOS, that provide a 
choice of fora or create new fora. They should also publicly communi-
cate their dissatisfaction with judicial decisions more often, as the Legal 
Adviser of the U.S. Department of State did following a recent ICJ 
judgment. 176 As Judge Meron has written: "Constructive criticism facili-
tates self-examination and self-improvement by the judiciary.' 1 77 
Courts, for their part, should adopt doctrines that mediate the preceden-
tial effects of their own decisions1 78 and encourage the publication of 
dissenting opinions. 179 They should also critically review and take into 
account the decisions and practices of other courts.1 80 Indeed, instead of 
striving for uniformity, we should accept and develop a system of com-
petitive adjudication in international law. 
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